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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
OKLAND LTD., INC., and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
OKLAND LTD., INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUG BRADSHAW, ROBERT M. 
SIMONSEN, CITY GATE CONDO-
MINIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
a limited partnership, 
and JOHN DOES 1 - 5 , 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Case No. 21032 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether there are sufficient disputed material facts 
to warrant reversal of the Summary Judgment entered against 
Defendant-Appellant Okland Ltd., Inc. (hereinafter "Okland" or 
"Appellant") and in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent, First 
Security Financial (hereinafter "First Security" or 
"Respondent"), including but not limited to the following: 
(a) no proof of damages; 
(b) no reasonable relationship between the alleged 
default of Okland and the damages awarded; and 
(c) no proof that Respondent has any interest in the 
matters complained of in its Complaint. 
2. Whether the Summary Judgment is supported by the writ-
ten Equipment Lease Agreement as a matter of law (hereinafter 
"Lease" [R. 3-6; A. 3-6]), and if so, whether the Lease should 
be declared void as a penalty. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is taken from the final Summary Judgment 
entered by the Honorable Judith M. Billings in the Third 
Judicial District Court against Okland and in favor of 
Respondent (Summary Judgment, R. 257-58; A. 30-33). 
The action involved the alleged breach or default of an 
Equipment Lease Agreement ("Lease" [R. 3-6; A. 3-6]) covering 
certain furniture and equipment purchased by Murray First Thrift 
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Leasing (hereinafter "MFT" [Respondent's alleged predecessor]) 
and a "leaseback" to co-Defendants Okland and Bradshaw-Ferrin 
Development Company (the latter, hereinafter "Defendant 
Bradshaw"), on September 30, 1981, for the exclusive use in the 
pre-offer and sale of condominium units at the then-to-be-built 
Wilshire Project ("Wilshire Condominiums") located at 10th East 
and 4th South Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. Summary Judgment 
was entered against Defendant Bradshaw for his default on the 
Lease on June 4, 1985, at which time Respondent calculated the 
accelerated balance on the Lease at $26,423.95 (R. 123-25). 
On October 15, 1985, Summary Judgment against Okland was 
formally entered by the lower court from which this appeal is 
taken. Such appeal involves Okland and Respondent exclusively, 
and as a result, third parties not affected by this Summary 
Judgment have stipulated to its finality for purposes of appeal. 
After considering arguments by the respective counsel for 
Respondent and Okland, and based on a review of the pleadings 
and record, the lower court found as a matter of law, that 
(1) there were no factual issues concerning the nature of the 
subject contract and the damages awarded; (2) the Respondent 
had properly pursued its remedies; and (3) there was no evi-
dence to support Okland1s allegation that the Respondent failed 
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to mitigate its damages (Judge's Ruling, R. 370-73; A. 
35-39). Based on these findings and other findings of the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings contained in the Judge's Ruling, 
the lower court entered Summary Judgment against Okland for 
$24,030.89, or the total alleged unpaid balance remaining 
on the Lease; $363.52 for 1984 property taxes; $384.80 for 
1985 property taxes; $1,201.25 for future monthly "late charges" 
prospectively assessed on the alleged accelerated balance; 
$6,055.77 in interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum on the amount so accelerated under the Lease since May 
1984; and $1,900.00 in attorney's fees, for a total judgment of 
$33,893.23. The Summary Judgment also granted interest on the 
total amount awarded at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum from the date of entry until paid, including accruing 
costs, attorney's fees and future expenses of location, 
repossession, and sale of the equipment which was the subject of 
the Lease; and the court further granted Respondent all 
necessary writs and orders of any nature to recover the equip-
ment, if, when, and apparently wherever located, such costs and 
expenses to be prospectively accessed Okland (R. 257-58; A. 
30-33) . 
The Honorable Judith M. Billings also found the total 
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amount "promised" under the Lease was the proper "remedy since 
there has been no repossession of equipment because the 
equipment has disappeared.", at R. 372; A. 38. The lower court 
also stated in answer to questions posed by Appellant's counsel 
concerning a trial on the issue of damages, " . . . No. I 
think the [supporting] affidavit is sufficient evidence of 
damages and there are no contravening affidavits to indicate 
those damages are not correct.", at R. 373; A. 39. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, as the alleged successor in interest to 
MFT, brought an action in the lower court against Okland and 
Defendant Bradshaw for breach of the Lease. The Lease was for 
a term of 60 months, with payments of $775.19 per month, com-
mencing September 30, 1981, and ending September 29, 1986 
(Complaint and Exhibit "A", [R. 2-6; A. 1-6]). The Lease 
reflects that the first and last payments were paid on execu-
tion of the Lease (R. 3; A. 3) leaving 58 remaining payments 
upon execution. 
Okland, in answering the Complaint made it clear to the 
Court and Respondent that it was in no position to verify any of 
Respondent's claims, while readily admitting liability under the 
Lease to MFT (Original Answer, Amended Answer, Cross-Claim and 
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Third-Party Complaint [specifically, 1MI 1-5 inclusive, of the 
Cross-Claim], R. 13-14, 191-93; A. 7-14). 
Okland affirmatively asserted that Respondent's Complaint 
failed to state a claim against it; that Okland had acted in 
good faith; and that Respondent had failed in any respect to 
attempt to mitigate the damages of which it complained (R. 
189-96; A. 7-14) . 
Okland also made clear that it executed the Lease in con-
templation of constructing the Wilshire Condominiums, and the 
equipment covered by the Lease was purchased by Defendant 
Bradshaw, sold to MFT, and "leased back" for this purpose. Okla 
further alleged that approximately 60 days after execution of 
the Lease, it withdrew from negotiations to construct the 
Wilshire Condominiums and failed to apply to MFT for written 
permission to be removed as a guarantor in reliance on represen-
tations of Defendant Bradshaw that written permission would not 
be necessary (R. 189-96; A. 7-14). Additionally, Okland 
stated that it believed Defendant Bradshaw and other named and 
unnamed successors-in-interest, including other third-party 
defendants, may have been released by Respondent or MFT, and 
that at all times, Defendant Bradshaw and third-party defendants 
had had the exclusive use, benefit and enjoyment of all equip-
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ment covered by the Lease (R. 189-96; A. 7-14). This same fac-
tual information was given to Respondent in the initial Answer, 
Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint filed by Okland (R. 
13-14). The Amended Answer, Cross-Claim and Third-Party 
Complaint included additional affirmative defenses to the effect 
that there was a failure of consideration and that MFT was a 
"secured party" only with respect to the equipment covered by 
the Lease (R. 189-96; A. 7-14). 
On April 4, 1985, without having conducted any [emphasis 
added] discovery in nearly a year since filing of the action, 
Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Okland 
and Defendant Bradshaw, asking the lower court for judgment 
against each, jointly and severally in the sum of $26,423.95, 
together with interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum, costs of court, expenses of repossession and sale and 
attorney's fees (R. 40-41). The Motion was supported by an 
affidavit of Respondent's counsel covering his attorney's fees 
(R. 36-37), and an affidavit of C. S. Cummings (R. 34-35; A. 
15-16). The affidavit of Mr. Cummings stated that he was an 
officer of First Security Financial and authorized to give the 
affidavit; that the matters set forth in the affidavit were of 
his own knowledge; that he had reviewed the Respondent's 
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Complaint and knew the contents thereof to be true; that he had 
reviewed the original Lease and believed the Lease attached to 
Respondent's Complaint to be identical in every respect; and as 
of the date of his affidavit, Okland and Defendant Bradshaw were 
indebted [emphasis added] to Respondent in the amount of 
$26,423.95, as calculated on the Lease, together with interest, 
plus expenses and attorney's fees, etc. (R. 34-35; A. 15-16). 
At the same time Okland's counsel filed an affidavit 
in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Respondent 
indicating that he had had conversations with Respondent's coun-
sel, Kyle W. Jones, who had indicated to him that the Lease was 
a "sale-leaseback" and not a "true" lease; and that prior to 
being required to formally respond to Okland's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents and 
Request for Admissions, Mr. Jones had indicated to him that no 
documentation or other information existed or was available 
regarding the Lease, whether or not it was a "sale-leaseback", 
including, but not limited to the absence of documentation as to 
the disposition of the equipment upon termination of the Lease; 
the residual at the expiration of the Lease; the payout; the 
actual damages of the Respondent; the beneficiary of any invest-
ment tax credit; depreciation; the useful life of the equipment; 
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or any other factual matter relevant to the Lease Agreement bet-
ween the parties and the liabilities for its breach. (R. 70-72; 
A. 20-22). Not one [emphasis added] of these facts has ever 
been controverted by Respondent, its counsel, or anyone else. 
Okland, through James G. Okland, at the same time also 
filed an affidavit in opposition to Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 47-50) in which he also disputed the bare 
unsupported allegations of damages, and again made it clear to 
Respondent that Okland was not in a position to obtain infor-
mation to verify the truth or accuracy of the matters outlined 
in affidavits in support of the Respondent's Motion; and also, 
that he believed the equipment which was the subject of the 
Lease was of substantial value and could be so disposed of to 
limit Okland's liability (R. 47-50). 
At such April hearing, the lower court granted Summary Judgment 
in favor of the Respondent as against Defendant Bradshaw (R. 
123-25) and continued Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Okland without date. 
From April through September 1985, Okland vigorously and 
diligently pursued Third-Party Defendants, Doug Bradshaw, Bob 
Simonson, City Gate Condominium Partnership, and Cross-Claimant 
Defendant Bradshaw, in an effort to locate the equipment and 
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mitigate its damages (R. 262-64, 53-54f 130-31, 271-72, 
357-58, 364-65, 138-39, 172-73, 197-99). Okland also submitted 
Interrogatories and Request fo. Production of Documents to 
Respondent and also took the deposition of one former employee 
of MFT (R. 42-43, 13-114, 138-139), the only individual really 
competent to testify on MFT (or Respondent's behalf), namely the 
leasing agent or broker who negotiated the Lease on September 
30, 1981 (R. 369; 211-214) . 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Okland was 
finally heard approximately six months later on September 23, 
1985. In support of the renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Respondent filed an additional affidavit of one D. R. Russell 
which states: That he had access to the files of First Security 
Financial and was authorized by it to make his affidavit; that 
the matters set forth were true of his own knowledge; that he 
had reviewed the allegations of the Complaint of Respondent and 
knew the contents to be true; that he had reviewed the corporate 
resolution of Okland, a check of MFT written to defendants and 
the related Bill of Sale concerning the equipment covered by the 
Lease and that all such documents were identical in every 
respect to the originals; that the equipment listed on the 
Schedules to the Lease was delivered to the defendants, and 
that. • • 
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"it [equipment] has not been repossessed by the 
Plaintiff; . . . 
"6. That as of the date of this affidavit, 
defendant Okland is indebted [emphasis added] to 
the plaintiff pursuant to the Equipment Lease 
Agreement as follows: 
a. 31 payments at $775.19 $24,030.89 
(last payment 2/29/84) 
b. property taxes for 1984 363.52 
c. property taxes for 1985 341.80 
d. Late charges (31 months) 1,201.25 
(.05 x 775.19 = $38.75) 
e. Interest (18% per annum 6,055.77 
from May 1, 1984) 
$31,993.23 
together with attorney's fees as provided by the 
Equipment Lease Agreement and the expenses of location, 
repossession and sale of the leased equipment" (R. 232-41, 
specifically 233; A. 17-19, specifically 18). 
The September 1985 amended affidavit of James G. Okland 
filed on behalf of Okland in opposition to Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment states that Mr. Okland is the Secretary of 
Okland Ltd., Inc. and authorized to make the statement on behalf 
of the Appellant; that the statements made are based on personal 
knowledge; that he signed the Lease on behalf of Defendant 
Okland with MFT; that the Lease does not reflect the actual 
agreement and intent of Okland, Defendant Bradshaw and MFT in 
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that Okland and Defendant Bradshaw would own all of the equip-
ment covered by the Lease at the end of the Lease and that title 
would pass to them; that he believed the equipment could be re-
leased, soldf or otherwise disposed of at substantial value and 
return? that MFT had agreed that Defendant Bradshaw would own 
the equipment at the end of the Lease and the Agreement was 
styled in lease form so that MFT could receive the investment 
tax credit; that Okland had never received an accounting of the 
application of payment made and believes that the amount claimed 
in the Respondent's Complaint of $26,423.95 as of May 1, 1984, 
was erroneous; that the demand letters received from Respondent 
in April and May, 1984, were for differing amounts (also, from 
different entities, [R. 207-08]) than that set forth in 
Respondent's Complaint; that no accounting had been made con-
cerning the first and last payments made on the execution of the 
Lease as reflected therein; that to the knowledge of Mr. Okland, 
the Respondent had not attempted to sell or otherwise dispose of 
the equipment to decrease the damages which Respondent allegedly 
stated had been incurred as a result of alleged delinquent 
payments; and further, that Respondent had never made any 
attempt to retrieve or even locate the furniture (R. 202-08; A. 
28-29). He further stated that there had been a discussion of 
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"residual" value or contract to purchase when the Lease was 
made which would further reduce damages when credited (R. 
202-08; A. 28-29)• 
Based on the foregoing, the Honorable Judith M. Billings 
entered Summary Judgment in favor of Respondent for each of the 
amounts set forth in the affidavit of D. R. Russell (R. 233; A* 
18), awarding further costs, expenses, and attorneys fees in 
locating and repossessing the equipment, including any future 
writs and orders in pursuit thereof (R. 257-58; A. 35-39). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only undisputed relevant and material facts in this 
action are those either admitted by Okland or claimed by Okland 
in its Answer, Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint (initial 
and amended) and supporting affidavits of James G. Okland 
and its counsel in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Okland admitted it executed the Lease with MFT; that 
MFT had not released it from any liability; that it believed co-
defendant Bradshaw or other successors-in-interest may have been 
released from any liability under the Lease by MFT; that 
Defendant Bradshaw or others had had the exclusive use, 
benefit, and enjoyment of all of the equipment covered by the 
-13-
Lease; that it had no information as to what had been paid or 
what was due under the Lease; that it believed the equipment 
which was the subject of the Lease was valuable and could be 
sold or leased; and that it had no information as to the 
whereabouts of the leased equipment [emphasis added] . Not one 
of these allegations has been denied or even remotely met by 
Respondent. 
Respondent's unverified Complaint and affidavits in sup-
port of its Motion for Summary Judgment are replete with 
conclusions of law, unsupported by any relevant facts, disputed 
or otherwise. Respondent has further failed to show it has any 
right to bring this action as there is no evidence to prove it 
is the successor-in-interest to MFT. In this respect, 
Respondent relies on the affidavits of two persons, one claiming 
to be an officer of First Security Financial and the other 
claiming to have had "access" to the files of First Security 
Financial, neither obviously, having an inkling as to the nature 
and intent of the Lease Agreement in issue as it involved MFT. 
Further, the carefully couched affidavit of the person with mere 
"access" to the nebulous files of First Security Financial, not 
MFT, epitomizes Respondent's total defiance of the facts and 
absence of proof of its case with the statement that "it (the 
-14-
leased equipment) has not been repossessed" (R. 234; A. 18). 
This allegation alone leaves every other possibility open, 
including prior sale or other disposition for value, receipt of 
insurance proceeds for loss of the leased equipment, including 
the fact that Respondent knew where the equipment was all along 
knowing Okland did not. 
Respondent would have one believe the denial by Okland of 
each and every allegation of Respondent's Complaint on the basis 
that Okland did not possess sufficient information to otherwise 
respond to the allegations was in bad faith. In the Memorandum 
of Respondent in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
154-158, specificially p. 156)f counsel for Respondent twists 
Okland1s good faith denial of lack of information to its advan-
tage by claiming its affidavits in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment clearly show Respondent to be the successor-in-
interest to MFTf and further that they evidence the exact unde-
niable amount due and owing by Okland to Respondent. Counsel 
for Respondent further states that none of the discovery con-
ducted by Okland or other parties has brought "in anything to 
change the above stated facts." With empty, self-serving 
responses like these to Okland1s First Set of Interrogatories to 
Plaintiff-Respondent, one need not wonder why the discovery con-
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ducted by Okland was fruitless as Respondent therein admits to-
"3. Please state what measures you have under-
taken to date to mitigate any damages for the 
alleged default on the lease. 
"ANSWER: At present, plaintiff is attempting 
to locate the equipment, it has filed a lawsuit 
seeking damages from the lessees and has completely 
complied with the duties and obligations set forth 
under the Lease Agreement, and have given notices to 
the lessees that a default has occurred and that 
they expect payment to be made. 
"4. Please state which party or parties speci-
fically made lease payments on each occasion from 
the period of the commencement of the lease until 
the date of its alleged default. 
"ANSWER: Plaintiff has no records of which 
party or parties specifically made the lease 
payments on the aforementioned Lease Agreement. 
All billings were sent directly to the lessee and 
any payments received were applied directly to the 
lease per any written instructions received. . . . 
"12. Please indicate and itemize your out-of-
pocket, actual, hard cash damages, exclusive of 
attorney's fees and other costs. 
"ANSWER: Under the terms of the Lease 
Agreement defendants were to pay sixty (60) 
payments at $775.19. There still remains due and 
owing thirty-one (31) payments under the aforemen-
tioned lease document leaving a balance due and 
owing of $24,202.63, there is also property taxes 
for 1984 that were paid by plaintiff in the amount 
of $363.52 plus possible 1985 estimated property 
taxes of $363.52. There is also included late fees 
on this lease in the amount of $2,170.92 together 
with the value of the equipment at the end of the 
lease, plus possible sales tax if it was to be 
sold, plus court costs and legal fees and interest." 
(Plaintiff's Answers to Okland1s First Set of 
Interrogatories.) 
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Okland's good faith admission of liability under the Lease 
with MFT was for naught. Eighteen months elapsed between the 
filing of the Complaint and the hearing on Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and there is still no evidence of 
Respondent's legitimate interest in the Lease or damages it has 
allegedly suffered, if any, as a direct result of the alleged 
default on the Lease. Respondent, if it is the successor-in-
interest to MFT, is and was always in a position to provide 
this information, and has had a duty to do so by virtue of 
Okland's responsive pleadings on file, particularly when 
Respondent knew or should have known who made payments to it all 
those months and thus knew or should have known the location of 
the furniture upon default. Respondent should not be permitted 
to profit by this unequivocal display of bad faith. 
The Summary Judgment granted against Okland defies all 
basic logic and legal premises. The total amount of the Summary 
Judgment coupled with the payments claimed by Respondent to have 
been made under the Lease total $57,924,12, an amount substan-
tially exceeding the total value of the five year Lease (sixty 
payments at $775.19 or $46,511.40) in which 2l^> years remained 
upon alleged default. 
Paragraph 14 of the Lease provides the lessor with an 
option for remedies in the event the leased equipment is lost or 
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destroyed, and the remedies granted Respondent by the lower 
court do not comport with the provisions of the Lease in this 
regard, assuming the equipment was indeed lost or destroyed. 
Further, the Lease also provides for repossession and sale of 
the leased equipment in the event lease payments are acce-
lerated, with resulting credit of the proceeds of any such sale, 
after the deduction of related costs and expenses to lessee. 
The award of the lower court is conspicuously deficient and far 
afield from the Lease's terms in this respect. The lower court 
seems to view the remedies contained in the Lease as cumulative, 
and this fact alone brings to mind simple but true axioms of law 
such as penalties being void, that an aggrieved party is entitled 
only to the benefit of its bargain; that an aggrieved party is 
entitled to be placed in the position it would have been in had 
the default not occured, and that he who seeks equity must to 
equity. Quite clearly, an acceleration of lease payments with 
interest and with "late charges" added to each payment acce-
lerated (as they are not at such time "past due"), together with 
prospective interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum on such accelerated amount (including sales and use taxes 
on allegedly lost equipment) is absurd. 
This matter should be reversed and remanded with instruc-
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tions to the lower court to find as a matter of law that if 
Respondent can show it is the successor-in-interest to MFT that 
it further show that it acted in a "commercially reasonably 
manner" in failing to take any action whatsoever to dispose of 
the equipment. In this regard, it is the responsibility of 
this Court to set such guidelines as to whether Respondent is 
foreclosed from a deficiency judgment or otherwise should be 
"no-caused"—a responsibility for and finding of which in this 
case this Court should not shrink from* 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1. 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
PLEADINGS, DEPOSITIONS, ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES, 
AND ADMISSIONS ON FILE AS THEY DO NOT SHOW AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS 
TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT AS AWARDED. 
Blatant and uncontroverted disputes of genuine material 
fact exist and therefore upholding the Summary Judgment would 
deprive Appellant of its day in court and the right to make its 
case thereby substantially altering the Summary Judgment. 
Alleged "Rental" Payment Balance — 31 Payments or What? 
Respondent's affidavit in Support of its Motion for Summary 
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Judgment (R. 232-34; A. 17-19) attests that the last payment made 
by lessees was on February 21, 1984. Respondent does not allege 
that the Lease was in default prior to that time; this por-
position coupled with the Lease, evidences that first and last 
payments were paid on September 30, 1981, amounting to 31 
payments or a total payment on the Lease of $24,030.89 until the 
time of the alleged default. If $24,030.89 was paid on the 
Lease and $44,296.80 was the total due under the Lease (Discount 
Sheet R. 216), the balance due and owinq Respondent on the date 
of alleged default would have been $20,265.91—an obvious dif-
ference from that awarded in the Summary Judgment. It is 
noteworthy that in Appellant's affidavit in Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the lower court was apprised that 
Respondent's calculation of damages was in issue as it had never 
made and could not render an accounting to Appellant (R. 
202-208, specifically 1(8). (See Summary of Argument, supra, and 
the evasive responses of Respondent to Okland's Interrogatories 
therein.) 
Assuming $20,265.91 was the total due under the terms of 
the Lease (through September 1, 1986 [emphasis added]) upon 
alleged default in March 1984, the Summary Judgment awarding 
Respondent accelerated damages in the amount of nearly 
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$34,000.00 at eighteen percent (18%) interest per annum until 
paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and expenses of 
location, repossession and resale of the equipment, including 
ownership of the leased equipment, is a far cry from the 
$20-some Thousand Dollars Respondent would have received at the 
end of 1986. Appellant is not even awarded use of the leased 
equipment, despite being required to pay the lease in full and 
more [emphasis added]. In addition, based on the fact that MFT 
actually bought the equipment for approximately $25,800.00 and 
appears to have received at least $24,000.00, on the Lease, 
Respondent, if a rightful assignee, is actually out-of-pocket 
only $1,800.00. 
"Late Charges" (Paragraph 20 of the Lease) 
The Summary Judgment further awards $1,201.25 in "late 
charges" on the alleged accelerated balance (31 payments) pur-
suant to the Lease (R. 258; A. 31). No authority exists for 
this proposition. It amounts to a windfall to Respondant and a 
penalty to Okland. 
Interest From May 1, 1984 Until October 15, 1985 on 
the Alleged and Unproven Balance 
The Summary Judgment further awards $6,055.77 in interest 
(eighteen percent [18%]) on the disputed $24,030.89 balance from 
the period of commencement of the suit until the Summary 
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Judgment was entered. 
Okland admitted its liability under the Lease at the outset 
and asked only for proof of Respondent's rights in the Lease and 
an accounting of damages which it could not ascertain. The law 
in Utah is clear that prejudgment interest is not a matter of 
right, but awarded only where the party against whom it is 
sought caused the delay in payment. L.A. Drywall, Inc. v. 
Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (1980 Utah). Any 
delay in resolving this matter was caused by failure of 
Respondent to provide proof of its interest and an accounting 
and its apparent bad faith in thwarting the efforts of Okland to 
mitigate damages or to ascertain any damages Respondent may have 
suffered. (See Summary of Argument, supra.) 
Use or Sales Taxes (Paragraph 16 of the Lease) 
The Summary Judgment awards 1984 and 1985 sales or use 
taxes of approximately $1,144.00 and yet the lower court ruled 
as a "matter of law" that the equipment had "disappeared" or was 
lost (R. 370-73). Pursuant to Section 59-16-3 (U.C.A.), pro-
perty must be stored, used or otherwise consumed in this State 
for collection of any such tax. Furthermore, there is no evi-
dence whatsoever that Respondent or anyone had or has not paid 
any such tax or that it is due or payable. 
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Sufficiency of Affidavits 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there are numerous 
issues of fact for trial on the issue of damages alone. Okland 
has produced evidentiary material in total contradiction to 
Respondent's claims, and it is otherwise apparent from the 
record why Okland could not directly contradict many of 
Respondent's allegations as it was not in a position of access 
to necessary information. As a result, its denial placed all of 
Respondent's allegations in issue. In Dupler v. Yates, 251 P.2d 
624, 637, (Utah 1960), headnote 8, coupled with Justice Wade's 
dissent states that when considering motions under Rule 56 it 
[position of access] "should be kept in mind in passing on this 
kind of motion [Summary Judgment]. Otherwise trial courts will 
be deciding cases on affidavits and depositions when there 
should be a regular trial." 
Further, the pleadings and affidavits of Respondent in sup-
port of its Motion for Summary Judgment are based on conclusions 
of law only, and Summary Judgment will only be granted when sup-
ported by affidavits which set forth facts admissible in eviden-
ce. Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., 596 P.2d 1025, 1026 
(Utah 1979); and Norton v. Blackham, 599 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1983) . 
-23-
Also Respondent has failed to act in a "commercially reaso-
nable" manner as a matter of law pursuant to 70A-9-504 U.C.A., 
1953 as amended and should be foreclosed from any award. (See 
Summary of Arguments, supra.) 
Mitigation of Damages 
Appellant need not belabor the point that under the cir-
cumstances of this case and Utah law, Respondent had a duty to 
mitigate its damages. Thompson v. Jacobsen, 463 P.2d 801, 23 
Utah 2d 359 (1970); Diede v. Davis, (Mont. 1983) 661 P.2d 838; 
Double D Amusement v. Hawkins, 20 Utah 2d 395, 438 P.2d 395 
(1968). 
In Green, et al. v. Nelson, 120 Utah 155, 232 P.2d 776, 
(1951, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"There are authorities holding that the burden of 
proving matters in mitigation or reduction of the 
amount of plaintiff's damages rests upon a defendant. 
1 Sedgwick on Damages, 9th Ed. 447 §227. However, 
such authority should not be relied upon as imposing 
the burden on a defendant to prove one of the essential 
facts which must be established in order to determine 
what plaintiff's damages are. There can be no mitigation 
or reduction of damages until damages are proved. [Emphasis 
added] Green, supra, at 783. 
There is not a shred of evidence offered by Respondent 
showing any good faith effort to mitigate its damages and locate 
the leased equipment or that it otherwise should not have brought 
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suit earlier for adequate assurances of performance, especially 
after assignment from MFT and knowing, if so, that no insurance 
existed to protect its new interest. For this reason alone, 
Respondent's actions and the question of whether it acted in a 
"commercially reasonable manner" in disposing of the leased 
equipment or failing to make any disposition of it should be 
determined at trial. Respondent's unilateral interpretation of 
the Lease (to which it was not party), is that it had no duty 
whatsoever to attempt to even locate the leased equipment 
despite being in a better position than Okland to have access to 
information so Okland could act to mitigate its own damages. 
(See Summary of Argument, supra.) 
In Haggis Management, Inc. v. Turtle Management, Inc., 19 
Ut. Adv. Rpt. 42 (Oct. 3, 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that plaintiff's failure to make a "commercially reasonable 
disposition" of the collateral contrary to the requirement of 
70A-9-504(3) (U.C.A. 1953, [1980 Ed.]) barred plaintiff from 
recovering a deficiency judgment based on failure of the secured 
party to give the debtor notice. In this case Respondent's 
inaction is ridiculously more prejudicial to the rights of Okland 
than plaintiff Haggis' mere notice failures with respect to 
Turtle Management. Based on the logic of Haggis (including the 
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well reasoned dissent of Justice Stewart [Utah 1979]), it is 
Appellant's contention that Respondent's intentional failure to 
mitigate its damages in even attempting to locate the furniture 
and its dedication to do nothing was not commercially reasonable 
and Respondent's action or lack thereof should bar Respondent 
from recovering any judgment from Okland. 
Parol Evidence Regarding Damages 
The lower court guite casually excluded any evidence of an 
oral understanding to purchase the leased equipment or any 
understandings with respect to whether the Lease was an 
installment sale, a lease, one intended for security, or a 
contract of guarantee, or even what its purpose was aside from 
its label. In Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, (Utah 1981) 624 P.2d 
706, the Utah Supreme Court held that a "lease agreement may not 
be what it purports to be. How these issues bear on 
Respondent's damages and the remedies available to it are fac-
tual considerations that the lower court has totally ignored. 
Okland's affidavit (R. 202-08; A.23-29) puts these con-
siderations into issue, and are uncontroverted. Also quotations 
from the deposition testimony of DeMar Riley, the sales leasing 
agent (R. 211-214, 369) and former employee of MFT, demon-
strate that he offered lessees (Okland and Defendant 
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Bradshaw) the opportunity to purchase the leased equipment based 
on the low residual of five percent (5%). Based on the 
reasoning of FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro Printers, 590 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1979) , the integration clause in the lease (which in that 
case did not mention such option), should be rendered ineffec-
tive to exclude parol evidence of the existence of the agreement 
of the parties. Furthermore, it is quite clear that the Lease 
is unintegrated in that it does not even reflect the true nature 
of the transaction, that being, that it was a "sale-leaseback"; 
that MFT purchased the leased equipment for slightly in excess 
of $25,000.00 from Defendant Bradshaw; and that Defendant 
to Bradshaw had purchased it for its specific uses; and had sold it 
MFT only to lease it back. 
Support for the admission of parol evidence in this case is 
further confirmed by the recent Utah case of Union Bank vs. 
Swenson, 19 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 22 (Sept. 27, 1985) in which the Court 
held inter alia, ". . .a Court must first determine whether the 
writing was intended by the parties to be an integration. In 
resolving this preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, 
indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible. Eie v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981)." Union Bank, 
supra, at 23. 
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In Blem v. Ringerinq, 488 P.2d 798, 260 Or. 46 (1971), the 
Supreme Court of Oregon held the parties may enter into two or 
more contemporaneous contracts relating to the same subject 
matter and they may reduce to writing only one or more of the 
same, the oral contracts being regarded as collateral and 
distinct from the written contract; in such instance the parol 
evidence rule does not bar proof of the oral agreement. 
In Alexander v. Simmons, 518 P.2d 160, 90 Nev. 23 (1974), 
the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the mere existence of a 
written contract is insufficient to prevent a party from showing 
a separate contemporaneous oral agreement. 
Based on the foregoing, the Summary Judgment should be 
reversed and remanded so that we might understand what MFT, 
Okland and Defendant Bradshaw intended. Respondent is the mere 
alleged assignee of MFT and is in no position to know what the 
agreement of the parties was. Finally, it is noteworthy that in 
the Summary Judgment rendered against Defendant Bradshaw, 
Respondent calculated the principal amount past due and owing 
under the Lease to be $26,423.95. This discrepancy on its face 
reveals that Respondent itself has not but a clue as to what its 




THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE LEASE 
AND IF SO, THE LEASE SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS A 
PENALTY, 
Lease 
Paragraph 14 of the Lease (R. 3 [reverse side] ; A. 3) pro-
vides certain remedies to Lessor in the event of loss or damage 
to the leased equipment. Specifically, in the event of loss or 
damage to the leased equipment, it provides that the lessee, at 
the option of lessor, will replace the leased equipment in good 
condition and repair; or replace the same with like equipment in 
good condition and repair with clear title in lessor; or pay to 
lessor the total of the following amounts: the total rent due 
and owing at the time of such payment [emphasis added], plus the 
present value [emphasis added] of all rent and other amounts 
payable by lessee with respect to said item from date of such 
payment to date of expiration of the lease; plus the value of 
said item which shall be equal to not less than ten percent 
(10%) purchase price on said item. It further provides that 
upon lessor's receipt of such payments, lessee and lessee's 
insurer shall be entitled to lessor's interest in said item, for 
salvage purposes, in its then condition and location, without 
warranty. Even if we were to assume the leased equipment is 
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lost (no evidence has been introduced to prove this fact), 
Respondent has totally failed to make any such election or pro-
vide Okland with the calculations required of it under this pro-
vision of the Lease. Furtherf the award of all right, titlef 
and interest in the leased equipment to Respondent, together 
with expenses of location and other related costs, is totally 
contrary to paragraph 14 of the Lease. 
Paragraph 21 covers matters related to default under the 
lease (R. 3 [reverse side]; A. 3). It provides the lessor may 
recover from lessee all rents and other amounts then due and as 
they shall thereafter [emphasis added] become due; that the 
lessor may take possession of the equipment; that the lessor may 
recover from lessee with or without repossessing the leased 
equipment the accelerated and total sum of all rent and other 
amounts due and to become due; "provided, however, that upon 
repossession or surrender of equipment, lessor may sell or 
otherwise dispose of equipment. . . and apply the net proceeds 
thereof after deducting all expenses, including attorney's fees 
. . . as required by law or in equity." The only logical 
meaning these two paragraphs could have, when read together, is 
that so long as the lessees have the use of the leased equipment, 
they should be required to pay sums due thereunder. Respondent 
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was made aware at the outset that Okland did not have the 
possession or use of the leased equipment, and was not in any 
position to ascertain its location, especially in light of the 
position taken by the Respondent that it may have been lost. 
Under Respondent's view of the Lease, lessee under the Lease 
could have given a "bad check" for the first and last payments 
under the Lease, on its execution, and Respondent could acce-
lerate all sixty (60) payments under the Lease ($46,511.40 [R. 
3, 216; A. 34]) and still recover the leased equipment—pray 
tell if it was lost in the interim. 
In other words, the Summary Judgment stands for the propo-
sition that a lessor can accelerate the lease, later repossess 
the alleged lost equipment and re-lease it for the remainder of 
the original lease term for a "double-recovery". 
Liquidated Damages and Penalties 
In the event the Summary Judgment can be reconciled with 
the terms and provisions of the Lease, the Appellant believes 
the Lease should be declared void as a penalty. 
Respondent has made no showing of proof of its actual 
damages so as to even determine if they are reasonably related 
to the accelerated damages awarded and therefore, the summary 
judgment should be reversed and remanded for findings as to 
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damages, the meaning of the contract, and whether the Lease is 
void as providing for unconscionable liquidated damages and a 
penalty. 
The Summary Judgment award of $34,000.00 at eighteen per-
cent (18%) interest per annum is not reasonably related by any 
stretch of the imagination to Respondent's actual damages 
(whatever they may be). In reviewing the Lease and Discount 
Sheet (R. 216), it shows Respondent, if truly the successor-in-
interest of MFT, to be receiving $24,030.89 in payments prior to 
default, plus Summary Judgment award of $33,893.23, totalling 
$57,924.12 substantially more than the total Lease value over 
five (5) years ($46,511.40) [R. 216; A. 34]), including all 
right, title and interest in the leased equipment, all of 
this despite the fact that the lease term does not expire until 
September of 1986! 
There are numerous cases standing for the proposition that 
damages awarded—regardless of Summary Judgment--are a penalty 
and void as a matter of law if no reasonable relationship is 
borne to any actual damages suffered and yet in this case, 
Respondent has not even bothered to prove its actual damages. 
Numerous cases stand for this proposition, the following of 
which are but a few. Young Electric Sign Co* v« Vedas, 564 
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P.2d 758, 760, (Utah 1979); Russell v. Ogden Union Ry & Depot 
Co., 122 Utah 107 247 P.2d 257 (1952); Croft B. Jensen, 86 Ut. 
13, 40 P.2d 198 (1935); Double D Amusement Co, v. Hawkins, 
supra,; Reed v. Armstrong, 6 Utah 2d 127, 312 P.2d 777 (1957). 
In Ricker v. Rombough, 261 P.2d 328, 120 CA 2d Supp. 912 
(1953) the court held that a rent acceleration clause in a lease 
in unenforceable and void as being an agreement for liguidated 
damages when the damages are readily ascertainable and such is 
void if no reference is made to actual damages. 
In In the Matter of Grodnik's, 128 F. Supp. 941 (U.S.D.C. D. 
Minn. 1955) the court held that contract provisions providing 
for liguidated damages in the event of default are prima facie 
valid; yet they will be declared invalid only where damage is 
stipulated and there is no reasonable relationship to the 
amount of actual injury suffered. 
In Ray v. Electrical Products Consolidated, 390 P.2d 607 
(Wyo. 1964) the Wyoming Supreme Court held that a provision in a 
contract fixing damages for breach will be construed as a 
penalty or forfeiture and hence unenforceable if it bears no 
reasonable relationship to the amount of actual damages. 
In Green, et al., v. Nelson, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the full 
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amount of the unpaid balance on a contract without showing their 
actual loss occasioned by Defendant's breach. 
In Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 449f 450, (Utah 1952) 
the Utah Supreme Court held that where parties to a contract 
stipulate to an amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid 
in the case of a breach of contract, such stipulation is 
generally enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not dispro-
portionate to damages actually sustained. Further, where enfor-
cement of a forefeiture provision in a contract would result in 
an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery bearing no reasonable 
relationship to actual damages suffered, the forfeiture provi-
sion is unenforceable. 
In Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where a forefeiture under literal terms 
of a contract results in awarding to a party a sum so entirely 
disproportionate to any damages he may have suffered that it 
shocks the conscience of the Court, a court of equity will 
neither approve nor enforce such a penalty. 
It is clear the award of the Summary Judgment is not sup-
ported by the Lease or if reconcilable with the Lease, is void 
on its face as a penalty. 
Furthermore, the provisions in the Summary Judgment 
-34-
awarding Respondent future and certain additional damages is 
void as it violates the premise that a judgment is final and 
settles all rights, claims, and obligations between the subject 
parties. The Summary Judgment grants future amounts which can-
not presently be ascertained. 
CONCLUSION 
There are infinite issues of fact precluding Summary 
Judgment in this case. In Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders 
of Canada Ltd., v. Y-Tex Corp. 590 P.2d 1306, (1979) the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming held that if there is any doubt as to 
the meaning of a written instrument there arises an issue of 
fact to be litigated and Summary Judgment is improper. In this 
case the lower court made such an exclusively factual deter-
mination sua sponte. 
Summary Judgment is a harsh measure and for such reasons con-
tentions of a party opposing the motion must be considered in a 
light most advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in per-
mitting him to go to trial. The motion should be granted only when, 
viewing the matter thusly, no right to recovery can be established. 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Ut. 2d 420, 413 P.2d 
807 (Utah 1966) . 
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The sustaining of Summary Judgment without affording a party 
the opportunity to present his evidence is a stringent measure 
which the Court should be reluctant to grant. Tangren v. Ingalls, 
12 ut. 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179, (1962). In the case at bar the 
lower court made evidentiary conclusions about the Lease and 
truth as to the numerous controverted facts, the Okland's affir-
mative defenses relative to the damages awarded, the nature of 
the Lease, and the intent of the parties—all when Respondent 
was not even a party to the Lease. Such is clear injustice and 
manifest error as in Summary Judgments evidence is not reviewed, 
yet the lower court ruled the leased equipment had disappeared.H 
Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974). 
In the case of Elrod v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. 
of Des Moines, Iowa, 440 P.2d 544, 201 Kan. 254 (1968), the Court 
held that the amount of loss or damage is generally a fact issue 
which should not be determined by an affidavit on a motion for 
summary judgment. In Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 
P.2d 238, (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
presence of a dispute itself as to what is a material fact 
disallows the granting of summary judgment. Thus the kind and 
nature of agreement is relevant and Appellant has been whole-
heartedly deprived of an opportunity to present such relevance 
at a trial. 
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In Fredrick May & Co. v. Dunny 13 Ut. 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266, 
(1962), the Utah Supreme Court held "that where there are 
complicated legal questions presented and it appears that if 
issues were tried, other evidence would be adduced, it is wise 
policy to deny summary judgment and determine issues of fact by 
trial." 
In the recent Supreme Court case of Haggis Management, Inc. 
vs. Turtle Management, Inc., 19 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 42, 45, (October 
3, 1985), the Honorable Justice Stewart in his unequivocal 
dissenting opinion said: 
"Where different inferences and conclusions can be 
drawn, summary judgment is inappropriate, even if the 
underlying facts are not disputed. Ultimate questions 
of mixed fact and law —such as the instant case — are 
not to be discarded by a judge in derogation of a 
party's right to trial by jury. Butler v. Sports Haven 
International, Utah, 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1977). 
"This rule is in accord with what numerous courts have 
held. Even if the basic evidence is not in conflict, 
summary judgment is not appropriate if a jury could draw 
differing, but reasonable conclusions from that evidence. 
See, e.g. , ITT Terryphone Corp. v. Modem's Plus, Inc. 19 71 
GA. App. 710, 320 S.E. 2nd 784, 787 (1984); Lundy v. 
Hazen, 90 Ida. 323, 411 P.2d 768, 770 (1966). In this 
case a jury trial should have been demanded and the case 
should have been submitted to a jury." Haggis Management, 
Inc., supra, at 45. 
For the above reasons, Okland urges that the Court relieve 
itself of the burden of further inquiry into Appellant's riqht 
to a trial on the issue of damages (as it has acknowledged 
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liability) and that the Court forthwith reverse and remand the 
Summary Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, with spe-
cific guidelines as to what Respondent must prove to show it 
acted reasonably in order to be entitled to any recovery, let 
alone its conceivable "double recovery". 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of June, 1986, 
JohiY Michael Coomba 
/ttorney for Appellant Okland 
Leonard W. Burningham 
Attorney for Appellant Okland 
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OKLAND LTD. INC., and 
BRADSHAW FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 




As a cause of action against the defendants, plaintiff alleges 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff First Security Financial is a Utah corporation 
engaged in the thrift, loan and equipment leasing business with its principal 
place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendants Okland Ltd. Inc., and Bradshaw Ferrin Development 
Company, now known as Bradshaw Development Company, are both Utah corporations 
with their principal places of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. On or about September 30, 1981, Okland Ltd. Inc. and Bradshaw 
Ferrin Development Company as lessees entered into an Equipment Lease Agree-
ment with MFT Leasing as lessor, a true and complete copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A and Incorporated herein by this reference. 
4. First Security Financial is the successor in interest to MFT 
A. 1 r-nooOS 
Leasing under the Equipment Lease Agreement, entitled to all of the benefits 
thereunder. 
5. The Equipment Lease Agreement provides for the payment of 
certain periodic rental payments to the lessor, not all of which have been 
made when due. 
6. As a result of the failure of the lessees to make the payments 
as and when due, the Equipment Lease has been declared in default. 
7. Pursuant to the terms of the Equipment Lease, the lessees are 
jointly and severally liable to plaintiff in the amount of $26,423.95, plus 
interest thereon at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from and 
after May 1, 1984 until fully paid, both before and after judgment, plus 
costs of court, expenses of repossession and sale of the equipment, and 
attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendants, 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $26,423.95 plus interest thereon eft 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum from and after May 1, 1984 until fully paid, 
both before and after judgment, plus costs of court, expenses of repossession 
and sale of the equipment, attorney's fees, and such other and further relief 
as the court deems just or the right to which may be established at trial. 
WILKINS & JONES 
DATED this /^ ~ day of May, 1984 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
135 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
-2-
MFT LEASING 
135 South Mam Street 
ASSIGNED TO MFT LEASING S a , t U k e ° l t V ' U t f t h 
COMMERCIAL SEGUSITY BANK 
ay ^ ~^L(jf S^ V 
V I C E P R E S I D E N T " ~ , - A A Q{ 
LEASE A G R E E M E N T made and entered tnto th.s j L S t f e a y of 1 — 194L by 




((ALWAYS ftCFEA TO ABOVE NO) 
and between MFT LEASING a Utah corporation with ol-
OKLAND LTD INC. and 
BR/IDSHAW F^RTN pEVELOPMENT fOMPAN\ 
As C o - L e s s e e s 
699 East South Temple 
S u i t e 310 
— S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 841U2 LeTseT 
Laseor hereby leasas to Leaaee. and Leaaee hereby leases from Letaor the following described personal property (the Equipment) upon the following 
terms and conditions * 
QTY SERIAL NO EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION SUPPLIER NAME AND AOORESS 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT A WHICH BECOMES A PART HEREOF 
yX) If this Block is checked, see Exhibit A consisting of _-L_ pages attached hereto and a part hereof for Quantity, Serial Numbers. Description Sup-
plier and other Equipment information 
The Equipment will at all times during the term of this lease oe located at the address of Lessee shown above or at 
TERMS AttP CONDITIONS Of LSASS 
1 LEASE TERM AND P A Y M P N T Lessee shall pay Lessor at us 
offices m Salt Lake City Utah or at such other place as Lessor may 
designate in writing the periodical rental payments for the term in-
dicated 
It other than monthly rental pavments the terms are as 
fOllOWS . _ _ » _ _ » « - _ _ _ - - - - _ - - - _ « - _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ — - _ - _ - _ - — 
^m Commencement, Pate;. Leese T * " " S 1 X t 
Monthly Rental Payment % 7 ^ 8 , ? 8 
Monthly Use Tea: $ 3 6 i Q l -




7 7 5 , 1 9 
In addition, advance payments equal to the first and last . 
u due and payable upon acceptance of thts lease by Lessor 
_months rental payments in the total amount of Si , 5 5 0 . 3 8 
2 NO WARRANTIES BY LESSOR LESSEE HAS SELECTED BOTH ia) EQUIPMENT AND ID) SUPPLIER FROM WHOM LESSOR IS TO PURCHASE IT LESSOR MAKES 
NO WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS TO ANY MATTER WHATSOEVER INCLUDING THE CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT ITS MERCHANTABILITY OR ITS FITNESS 
FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND AS"To LESSOR LESSEE LEASES EQUIPMENT AS is 
3 CLAIMS AGAINST SUPPLIER. If Equipment is not properly installed does not operate as represented or warranted by Supplier or is unsatisfactory for any reason 
Lessee shall make any claim on account thereof solely against Supplier and snail nevertheless pay Lessor all rent payable under trus lease Lessor will include as a con-
dition of us purch*** order that Supplier agree that all warranties agreements and representations if any which may oe made Oy Supplier to Lessor may oe en forced Oy 
Lessee in its own name Lessor hereoy agrees to assign to Lessee and does hereoy assign solely for the purpose ol making, and prosecuting any said claim all of the rights 
which Lessor nas against Supplier toi Oreach of warranty or otn<w lepieteniauon respecting Equipment 
I 
* SUPPLIER NOT AN AGENT Lessee understands and «gret»s mat nenner Supplier nor any salesman or other agent of Supplier is an agent of Lessor and that Lessor 
is not an agent of Supplier No salesmen or agent of Supplier is authorized to waive or alter any term or condition of this lease and no representation as to Equipment or any 
other matter by Supplier shatl in any way affect Lessee s duty to pay the rent and perform us other ooiiqations as set forth m this lease 
5 OROERING EQUIPMENT. Lessee hereby requests Lessor to purchase the Equipment from the aoove named Suppliers) Lessor agrees to purchase the Equiomemaa 
selected by Lessee and Lessee agrees to arrange tor delivery of the Equipment so that n can be accepted on or before the commencement date of this lease as set forth in 
paragraph t above Lessee hereby authorizes Lessor to insert m this lease the commencement date identification numbers and other descriptive data for the Equipment 
6 AGREEMENT INCLUOES REVERSE StOE HEREOF This lease including the reverse side hereof correctly sets »onf\ the entire lease agreement between Lessor and 
Lessee and no agreement or understanding claimed by either party hereto snail be binding unless specifically set fonn herein Tne term Lessee as used herein shall mean 
and incluoe any and all Lessees who sign hereunder earn of whom shall be jointly and severally bound hereby 
7 DECLARATION OF BUSINESS PURPOSE Lessee hereby warrants and represents mat the Equipment will be used fo» business purposes and not for personal family 
household or agricultural purposes Lessee acknowledges that Lessoi has relied upon mis representation m emenrq into ihis lease 
en 
THIS LEASE ALSO INCLUDES ALL TERMS AND PROVISIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF 
THIS LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELLED BY LESSEE. 
LESSOR 
-L££2£E (Authorized Slgnalur* t Till*) 
Data pted 
EXHIBIT A 
Data Executed by Leasee 
Lesaea's Social Security NumOej 
Empk*er * 1.0. Number j± 
(II Corporation President Vice President or Treasurer sneutt 
sign and give official title if Proprietor or Partner, state which) 




M F T LEASING 
EXHIBIT A 
SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT NAME OF LESSEE 
Okland LTD. Inc. and 
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company 
699 East South Temple Suite 310 





















SERIAL NO. EQUIPMENT (MANUFACTURER, MAKE/ MODEL S, DESCRIPTION) 
Floral Brass Arrangement 






Sofa Orlanda Garden 
Circular Hunt Desk 
Green High Back Arm Chairs 
Leather Arm Chair 
Lamp Table Lattice 
Lattice Couch Table 
Oak Frame & Glass for Renderings 
Oak Frame for Large City Scape Photo 
Builder/Developer Panel 
Frames 
Availability Board 2-Color Sil Screened 
Frame and Glass 
Prints and Mounting 
1 Sign for Hallway 20 x 20 2-Color 1 Side Installed 
DATE: 
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE. 
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO 
BE SHOWN ABOVE. 
'*/r/ 
LEASE N O . : 1 0 - 0 0 3 1 7 4 3 - 6 
BY : ^ . ^ 0 1 £ P S ^ 
IGNATURE TITLE . 
BY 
SIGNATURE / T i S f i -
 (, ^ 
M F T LEASING 
EXHIBIT A 
SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT Ok land LTD.TO,^ E S S E E 
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company 
699 East South Temple Suite 310 






EQUIPMENT- (MANUFACTURER, MAKE, MODEL {, DESCRIPTIONj 
Sign for Exterior - 30 x 30 2-Color 2 Sides Installed 
Rug 6 x 9 Flora Green 
36 x 72 Oak Windsor Desk 
No. 2395 Lamp Brass 
Peach Sofa 
No. 103 Camel Chairs, Armed 
811 SW Camel Chair Exec. 
Windsor Left Oak Steno Desk 
720 Beige Chairs 
750S Green Chair Exec. 
9/16" Ecco Bond Pad (33.33 yds) 
Rug(Oriental in entry) 
No. 8292 Landscape Picture 
No. 8273 Dear in Forest Picture 
Scale Model of the Wilshire Condominium 
Interior Renderings of Wilshire 
Silk Screened Floor Plans 2-Color w/Backlighting 
Floor Plan Display Tables 
Large Table Housing 3 Floor Plans 
Large Table for Scale Model Display 
Ink Floor Plans § Photostats 
DATE: 
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE. 
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO 
BE SHOWN ABOVE. 
?/*/£/ 
LEASE NO.: 10-0031743-6 
BY: 




G t O -
M F T LEASING 
EXHIBIT A 
SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT NAME OF LESSEE 
Okland LTD Inc. and 
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company! 
699 East South Temple Suite 310 




SERIAL NO. EQUIPMENT (MANUFACTURER, MAKE,* MODEL S, DESCRIPTION 
30 x 36 Sample Board Panels for Interior Design 
30 x 52 Sample Board Panel for Interior Desing 
DATE: 
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE. 
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO 











A. 6 ^ C Y O O S 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS - #3639 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-0833 
Attorney for Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
OKLAND LTD. INC., and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO. , 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 




DOUG BRADSHAW, ROBERT M. 
SIMONSEN, CITY GATE CONDO-
MINIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
a limited partnership, 




Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , by and through its attorney of 
record, John Michael Coombs, hereby amends its response to the 
-1-
AMENDED ANSWER, CROSS-CLAIM 
AND 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C-84-2941 
Judge Billings 
A. 7 
specific allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint and affirmatively 
defends as follows as permitted by leave of court given this 
Defendant on September 6, 1985, 
1. Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. has insufficient knowledge 
or information with which to either admit or deny the first 
allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint, and therefore denies 
Plaintiff's first allegation in its Complaint. 
2. Defendant Okland Ltd.
 f Inc. , has insufficient 
knowledge or information to either admit or deny the second 
allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint, and therefore denies 
Plaintiff's second allegation in its Complaint. 
3. Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., denies paragraph three of 
Plaintiff's Complaint in that Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" does not 
set forth the entire agreement between the parties. 
4. Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., has insufficient knowledge 
or information with which to either admit or deny paragraph four 
of Plaintiff's Complaint and therefore, denies the same. 
5. Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., has insufficient knowledge 
or information with which to either admit or deny paragraph five 
of Plaintiff's Complaint and therefore, denies the same. 
6. Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., has insufficient knowledge 
or information as to whether Defendant lessee and other suc-
cessors in interest have failed to make payment as and when 
due* . and as a result thereof , said Equipment Lease has been 
-2 
\. 8 tiQQ'l'J an 
declared in default, and therefore, denies paragraph six of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
7. Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , denies the allegations in 
paragraph seven of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
8. Plaintiff's several allegations fail to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. 
9. Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , has acted in good faith 
with respect to Plaintiff's several allegations contained herein. 
10. Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages of which 
it complains herein. 
11. Plaintiff's claims are barred by failure of 
consideration. 
12. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the fact that the 
agreement between the parties involves a security interest 
governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
CROSS-CLAIM 
Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , cross-claims against 
co-Defendant lessee Bradshaw Development Company as follows: 
1. On September 30 , 1981 , James G. Okland, on behalf of 
Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , signed the subject Equipment Lease 
attached to Plaintiff's Complaint s Exhibit "A", a true and 
correct copy of which is attached as Plaintiff's Exhibit ,fAM and 
cosigned by Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company now known as 
-3-
A. 9 
Defendant Bradshaw Development Company, a Utah corporationf in 
which Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw is a principal 
shareholder. 
2. Approximately 60 days subsequent to said cosigning by 
Defendant Okland Ltd.
 f Inc. f of said Equipment Lease , Defendant 
Okland Ltd. , Inc. , withdrew from The Wilshire Project which 
concerned said lease, leaving co-Defendant Bradshaw Development 
Company and others, including all known and unknown Third-Party 
Defendants in full responsiblity and liability therefor. 
3. Defendant Okland failed to apply to Plaintif lessor 
for written permission to be removed as guarantor of the subject 
Equipment Lease as per the terms of said Equpment Lease based on 
the oral representations of Defendant Bradshaw Development 
Company that such would not be necessary. 
4. Defendant Bradshaw Development Company, along with 
other named and unnamed successors in interest, Third-Party 
Defendants herein, made payment of certain periodic rental 
payments to Plaintiff/Lessor up until the time of the alleged 
default , and Defendant Bradshaw Development Company has at all 
times material herein, had the exclusive use, benefit and 
enjoyment of all equipment under the subject Equipment Lease 
all of which has caused Defendant Okland damage. 
5. Defendant Bradshaw Development Company, by and through 
its officer and director, Doug Bradshaw, has represented to 
-4 
A. 10 *oO 
Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , that it wold payf assume and hold 
Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , harmless from all payments and 
liability under said Equipment Lease, the default of which has 
caused Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. damage. 
WHEREFORE, Co-Defendant Okland prays for judgment against 
Defendant Bradshaw Development Company for any and all amount 
which is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to Plaintiff's Complaint 
on file herein, for interest thereon, costs of court, out-of-
pocket or other expenses, attorney's fees, and any and all 
other relief the Court deems just or equitable in the preimises. 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Okland hereby complains 
of named Third-Party Defendant and unknown Third-Party 
Defendants pursuant to Rule 9(a)(2) as follows: 
1. Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw is a resident of 
the State of Utah and is director, officer and principal share-
holder in Bradshaw Development Company, defendant herein. 
2. Third-Party Defendant Robert M. Simonsen is a Utah resident 
and successor in interest to Okland Ltd. , Inc. , under the sub-
ject Equipment Lease, damages for the default of which Plaintiff 
complains of in its Complaint on file herein. 
3. Third-Party Defendant City Gate Condominium Partnership 
is a Utah limited partnership and successor in interest to 
Okland Ltd. , Inc. , with respect to the subject Equipment Lease. 
A. 11 
4. John Does 1-5 are heretofore unknown Third-Party 
Defendants, successors in interest to Defendant Okland Ltd,
 f who 
have caused damage to Defendant Okland by virtue of Plaintiff's 
Complaint and have had the usef benefit, and enjoyment of the 
equipment subject hereto, and at such time as their names are 
discovered Third-Party Plaintiff Okland shall amend its 
Complaint herein accordingly, 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
5. Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw orally represented 
to Third-Party Plaintiff that he , in conjunction with each and 
all other Third-Party Defendants would be responsible for the 
subject Equipment Lease and any default thereof. 
6. Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw in conjunction with 
each and all other Third-Party Defendants has breached his 
agreement to be responsible and liable for the subject Equipment 
Lease for which Third-Party Plaintiff may be liable to 
Plaintiff. 
7. Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw has failed to so 
indemnify or so assure Third-Party Plaintiff and otherwise 
secure a written consent from Plaintiff on Okland's behalf as to 
relinquishing Third-Party Plaintiff's liability under the sub-
ject Equipment Lease. 
8. Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw's breach of his 
-6-
A. 12 
oral agreement on behalf and in conjunction with each and all 




9. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates allegations 1 
through 8 in its Third-Party Complaint as if they were set forth 
more fully hereafter verbatim. 
10. Third-Party Defendants Simonsen, Bradshaw, and City 
Gate Condominium Partnership and/or other unknown Third-Party 
Defendants have each and all had the use, benefit, and enjoyment 
of the equipment subject to the Equipment Lease herein and are 
thereby liable to Third-Party Plaintiff for being unjustly 
enriched at Third-Party Plaintiff's expense. 
COUNT III 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
11. Third-Party Plaintiff Okland Ltd. , Inc. , incorporates 
allegations 1 through 10 in its Third-Party Complaint as if they 
were set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
12. Third-Party Plaintiff has relied to its detriment on 
the representations of Third-Party Defendants that they, jointly 
and severally as successors in interest to Defendant Okland on 




WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiff prays for jugment against 
each and all Third-Party Defendants, jointly and severally, and 
each and all unknown Third-Party Defendants on all three counts 
in the amount that Third-Party Plaintiff may be liable to 
Plaintiff, for interest thereon, costs of court, out-of-pocket 
or other expenses, attorney's fees, and any and all other relief 
as the Court deems just and equitable") in yne premis/s. 
DATED this 9th day of September / 19/85///// S 
faeir tfdombl 
/Attorney for Okland Ltd. , Inc, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of September, 
1985, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Answer to 
Steven D. Crawley, Attorney for Bradshaw Development Co., Doug 
Bradshaw, and City Gate Condominium Partnership, Suite 107, 2225 
East Murray-Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117; Kyle W. 
Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 200 South Main, Suite 1000, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101? and R. L. Gardiner, FOX, EDWARDS, 
GARDINER & BROWN, 57 West 200 South, Suite J4Q0, P. O. Box 3450, 




Kyle W. Jones - 1744 
Attorney for Plaintiff *> 
200 South Main, Suite 1000 ... * . xrir\<\ rt<N * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, : 
a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs '. AFFIDAVIT IN 
. SUPPORT OF JUDGMENT. 
OKLAND LTD., INC. and : 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT : 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
OKLAND LTD., INC., : 
Third-Party : 
Plaintiff, : 
: Civil No. C-84-2941 
VS . : 
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN, : 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,: 
a limited partnership and : Assigned: Judge Billing 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
C. S. Cummings, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That he is an officer of First Security Financial 
and authorized to make this statement on its behalf. 
2. That the matters set forth in this Affidavit are 
true of affiant's own knowledge. 
3. That affiant has reviewed the allegations contained 
in the Complaint on file in this matter and knox^ s the contents 
thereof to be true. 
4. That affiant has reviewed the original of the 
Equipment Lease Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the 
Complaint as Exhibit A, and does verify the Exhibit attached to -
the Complaint is identical in every respect to the original 
document. 
5. That as of the date of this Affidavit, defendants 
Okland Ltd., Inc. and Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company, now 
known as Bradshaw development Company are indebted to First 
Security Financial in the amount of $26,423.95, as calculated 
per the Lease, plus interest at the rate of eighteen percent 
(18%) per annum until paid, plus costs of court, expenses of 
repossession and sale of the equipment, and a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 1985. 
C. S. Cummings 




Residing in Salt Lake County, UT. 
My commission expires: 
-2- t?00ti35 
A. 16 
Kyle W. Jones - 1744 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
200 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 359-7771 
2-3 
(Xii JA^p o lai^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, : 
a Utah corporation, : 
vs. 
Plaintiff, : 
OKLAND LTD., INC. and : 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT : 
COMPANY, now known as : 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation, ' : 





DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN, '. 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,: 
a limited partnership and : 




SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2941 




: SS . 
County of Salt Lake ) 
D.R.Russell, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That he has access to the files of First Security 
Financial and is authorized by it to make this statement on 
it's behalf. 
2. That the matters set forth in this affidavit are true 
of affiant's own knowledge. 
3. That affiant has reviewed the allegations contained 
in the complaint on file in this matter and knows the contents 
thereof to be true. 
4. Affiant has reviewed the orginals of the Equipment Lease 
Agreement, the corportate resolution, Check no 16535 written by 
MFT laseing to defendants,both front and back, and the Bill of 
Sale to the defendants, copies of which are attached to this 
affidavit as exhibits A through D, and does verify the 
exhibits are identical in every respect to the original 
documents. 
5- That the equipment listed on the Schedules to the 
Equipment Lease Agreement was delivered to the defendants £nd 
that it has not been repossessed by the plaintiff. 
6. That as of the date of this affidavit, defendant Okland 
is indebted to the plaintiff pursuant to the Eqipment Lease 
agreement as follows: 
a. 31 payments at $775.19 $24,030.89 
(last payment 2/29/84) 
b. property taxes for 1984 $ 363.52 
c. property taxes for 1985 $ 341.80 
d. Late charges (31months) $ 1,201.25 
(.05 x 775.19=$38.75) 
e. Interest(18% t>er annum $ 6,055.77 
from May 1, 1984) 
subtotal $31,993.23 
together with attorney's fees as provided by the Equipment Lease 
Agreement and the expeneses of location, repossession and sale. 
A- 18 ~2~ 
of the leased equipment. 
DATED this <^£2'^day of September, 1985. 
^ - ^ W ^ j ^ ^ 




Residing in Salt Lake County, Ut~ 
My commission expires-. / ^ - / -So 
A. 19 
-3-
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS - #3639 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7074 
E. PAUL WOOD - #3537 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorneys for Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OKLAND LTD. INC., and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 




DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSON, 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PART-
NERSHIP, a limited partnership 





AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS beinq first duly sworn, deposes and 
says as follows: 
1. That I am legal counsel to Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiff, Okland Ltd. Inc. in the above entitled matter. 
2. That I have had conversations with Kyle Jones, Attorney 
for Plaintiff relative to the above. 
3. That in conversations Mr. Jones indicated to me that 
the purported "lease" agreement was in actuality a "sale 
leaseback" and not a "true" lease and therefore, my 
understanding of the law is that the aqreement would be for 
security. 
4. That while Plaintiff has additional time within which 
to formally respond to Defendant/Third Party Defendant Okland 
Ltd., Inc.'s First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production 
of Documents and Requests for Admissions, Mr. Jones orally indi-
cated to me that no documentation or other information exists or 
is available as to the purported "lease" other than a notation 
that the lease is in fact a "sale leaseback" including but not 
limited to the absence of documentation as to the disposition of 
the title of the property upon termination of the lease, the 
residual on the lease, the payout, the actual damaqes of Plain-
-2 
A. 21 000071 
tiff, the identity of the beneficiary of the investment tax cre-
dits and depreciation, the useful life of the equipment, and 
other factual matters relevant to the agreement between the par-
ties and the liability ifor its breach. 
DATED this f\_ day of May, 1985 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me/this IS ~ day of May, 
1985. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 




JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS - #3639 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 





" 1 . 
Z0 NuAH'K 
' . ^ERK 
LJa*n<* Z^tfTEfiPc 
Attorney for Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
OKLAND LTD. INC. , and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO. , 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 




DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSON , 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PART-
NERSHIP, a limited partnership 
and JOHN DOES 1 - 5 , 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AND REVISED 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. OKLAND 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2941 
Judge Billings 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
A. 23 
JAMES OKLAND, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says that: 
1. I am the Secretary of Okland Ltd. , Inc. , and authorized 
on behalf of the corporation to make this Affidavit. 
2. The statements made herein are based upon personal 
knowledge. 
3. On or about the 30th day of September, 1981 , I signed 
the Agreement attached to Plaintifffs Complaint as Exhibit "A". 
4. The Agreement does not reflect the actual agreement and 
intent of Okland Ltd. , Inc. , the co-Defendant Rradshaw-Ferrin 
Development Company and Murray First Thrift in that Okland Ltd. , 
Inc. , agreed to purchase the property from Murray First Thrift 
rather than lease the property as described in the Agreement. 
5. At the end of the payment term, all of the property 
described in the schedules should be owned by Okland Ltd. , Inc., 
and the co-Defendant Rradshaw-Ferrin Development Company and 
title should pass to us. 
6. This creates a significant difference in that upon 
passage of title , the equipment could be leased , sold or other-
wise disposed of giving Okland Ltd. , Inc., subhstantial value 
and return. 
7. Murray First Thrift orally agreed that Okland Ltd. , 
Inc. , and the co-Defendant Bradshaw Development Company at the 
expiration of the Lease, would be the owners of the property, 
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but that the Agreement should be styled in a lease form so that 
Murray First Thrift could receive the investment tax credit on 
the equipment. 
8. With respect to the alleged default under the 
Agreement, I have never received an accounting of the applica-
tion of payment made and believe that the amount requested in 
Plaintifffs Complaint of $26f423.95 as of May 1, 1984 , is 
erroneous. 
9. During the first part of April, 1984f I received a com-
munication from the Plaintiff, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
10. At the time of the letter, which was April 3, 1984, 
the entire balance due was $25,837.91 which is substantially 
less than the amount prayed for in the Compl nt. 
11. During the first part of May, 1984, I received the 
letter from Plaintiff's attorney attached hereto as Exhibit "B" 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
12. As of the date of Exhibit "B" , April 27, 1984, the 
alleged amounts due for delinquent payment was 52,438.15 which 
does not equal the delinquent balance claimed on April 3, 1984, 
plus an additional monthly payment of $775.15. 
13. In addition, the original payment to Murray First 
Thrift included the last monthly payment which, to my knowledge, 




14. To my knowledge, the Plaintiff has not attempted to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the equipment which is the subject 
of the Agreement to decrease the damages which they allegedly 
have incurred as a result of alleged delinquent payments. 
Further, the Plaintiffs have made no attempt to retrieve the 
furniture. 
15. That the Equipment Lease does not contain the oral 
understandings between the parties which existed prior to and 
contemporaneous with the signing of the Lease including but not 
limited to the fact that the Equipment Lease did not even allude _ 
to the fact that the transaction was in actuality a sale lease-
back , not a true lease. 
16. In addition, there were oral understandings as to the 
"residual" on the Lease which are not contained in the Lease, 
namely who would own the equipment upon expiration of the lease 
terms and conditions and what that unstated "residual" was or 
would be and upon what such was based. 
17. Finally, the written lease does not contain the 
several oral understandings as to the investment tax credits , 
depreciation, and other tax considerations and were purposely 
not put in the "lease" , including the "residual" , as it was my 
understanding that if these terms were written into the lease it 
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would not be a "lease" but another instrument more like a 
collateral sales agreement or security agreement which would 
more accurately reflect the true understanding of the parties 
hereto. 
18. Lastly, I do not believe that Okland Ltd., Inc. received 
any of the consideration for the sale portion of the sale lease-
back, a transaction which is not even mentioned in the "lease. 
day of September, 1985. DATED this ] [A 
-i 
. k £ ( ( 
JAMES G. OKLANfr 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before/fne 
September, 1985. 
My Commission Expires: 
•g/y? 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ay of September, 
1985, I mailed a ocpy of the foregoing Supplemental and Revised 
Affidavit to Steven D. Crawley, Attorney for Defendant Bradshaw, 
2225 East 4800 South, Suite 107, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117; 
Kyle W. Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 200 South Main Street, 
Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and to L. R./fGardiner, 
Jr., Attorney for Third-Party Defendant/simonsen, 5/1/ W^ £r^  200 
South, Suite 400, P. O. Box 3450, Sal? /Lak^/^L^y ,/l^ ta^ // $411f). 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
(30006 • SALT LAKE OTY. UTAH §4130 • TELEPHONE. (801) 350-5270 
April 3, 1984 
Oakland Ltd Inc. 
1978 South West Temple RE: Lease No. 531743 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Gentlemen: 
In accordance with the terms of your Lease Agreement and default 
provisions there-in, we hereby formally declare the above referenced 
lease in default and make demand for payment as follows: 
Payment amount due: $ 1,598.37 
Lease Balance: $ 24,239.54 
If this matter is not resolved to our satisfaction within (10) days 
from the date of this letter, we will proceed with all remedies that 
are available to us under the Lease Agreement. 
Should you decide to bring this lease current rather than pay the lease 
off and purchase the equipment, we will not tolerate furt!"er delinquent 
rental payments. Your payments will be expected on the date due. 
Sincerely yours: 









W I L K I N S 6c J O N E S 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
t O O S O U T H MAIN,SUITE IOtO 
SALT LAJCE C I T Y , U T A H 84101 
April 27, 1984 
TELEPHONE 
{ S 0 D 3 2 6 - 4 7 6 0 
-tflcland Limited 
1978 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 492 388 253 
Bradshaw Development Co. 
c/o Steven D. Crawley 
50 South Main, Suite 880 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 492 388 254 
Douglas C. Bradshaw 
1149 Mercedes Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 492 388 255 
Re: Okland Limited/Bradshaw Development Lease 
Gentlemen: 
This firm has been retained to represent the interests of First Security Financial 
with respect to an unpaid equipment lease obligation originally between MFT Leasing as 
lessor and Okland Limited and Bradshaw Ferrin Development as lessees. First Security 
Financial is the successor in interest to MFT Leasing. 
Formal demand is hereby made that the unpaid payments through April, 1984, in the 
total amount of $2,438.15, plus attorney's fees of $150.00 for a total payment of 
$2,588.15, be made within ten (10) days of the date of this letter. 
Your certified or cashier's check, made payable to "First Security Financial" 
should be mailed or delivered so as to be received by the undersigned within the time 
period specified. 
Your failure to make the payment as required will result in immediate legal actior 
to protect the interests of First Security Financial. 
Govern yourselves accordingly. 
WILKINS & JONES 
MJW:js 
cc: First Security Financial 
7 
Michael J. Wilkins 
A. 29 000?.v P R 
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ivyie w. Jones - 1/44 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
200 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 359-7771 
_!_ I I C t . : >t\o L""!-!C 
Ga': Lake Co'imy U ci 1 
OCT \5 1385 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OKLAND LTD., INC. and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants 




DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN, 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
a limited partnership and 
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 , 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
ft J- SKd f hfO .%$> 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2941 
Assigned: Judge Billings 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant 
Okland Ltd., Inc., came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
A. 30 , 0 o -
7 7 
u 
Judith Billings, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday, 
September 23, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff appeared 
by and through its attorney of record, Kyle W. Jones, and 
defendant Okland Ltd., Inc. appeared by and through its attorney 
of record, John Michael Coombs. No other parties appeared on 
behalf of any of the other parties in this matter. The court, 
after hearing the arguments in this matter, having reviewed the 
pleadings on file herein, finds that there is no factual issue 
with respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease 
or a security agreement or a contract of guarantee and that 
plaintiff has properly pursued its remedies and that there is no 
evidence to support defendantfs allegation that the plaintiff 
failed to mitigate its damages thereby the court enters this 
Judgment as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Okland 
Ltd., Inc., be granted and that plaintiff be awarded Judgment in 
the following amounts: 
$24,030.89 amount remaining to be paid under contract; 
363.52 property taxes for 1984; 
341.80 property taxes for 1985; 
1,201.25 late charges pursuant to contract; 
6, 055.77 interest; 
1,900.00 attorney's fees 
$33,893.23 Total Judgment 
with interest on the total Judgment at eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum as provided by the contract from the date of this Judgment 
until paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and the 
expenses of location, repossession and sale of the leased equipment 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff be granted all necessary writs and orders necessary to 
recover its leased equipment if and when it is located. 
DATED this j^ S day of September, 1985. 
BY THE XOURT 
Juflge* Judith Bi l l ings 
By ^ Q ^ L ^ n f t C f ~2~ 
J>t CJrjTk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a true and 
exact copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment this / [> day of 
September, 1985, postage prepaid, by U.S. mail, to: 
John Michael Coombs 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven D. Crawley 
2225 East 4800 South, Suite 107 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
P. 0. Box 3450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 





CIVIL NO. C-84-2941 
JUDGE'S RULING 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 23RD DAY 
OF SEPTEMBER, 1985, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:05 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY ThE 
HONORABLE JUDITH M. BILLINGS, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
S i l t i t k e County Utah 
MAR % A 19*0 
OtputyOtf* 
E i l e e n M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 


























A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
JUDGE'S RULING 
KYLE W. JONES 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
72 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
* * * 
I N D E X 
PAGE 3 
* * * 
E i l e e n M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 
A. 36 Jil 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 JUDGE BILLINGS: THE COURT IS PREPARED TO RULE ON THE 
3 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
4 THE COURT WILL GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
5 SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE COURT FEELS THAT THE ARGUMENTS RAISED! 
6 BY THE DEFENDANT DO NOT MAKE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPROPRIATE IN 
7 THIS CASE WHERE THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS A LEASE FOR A SECURP 
8 AGREEMENT. THE COURT FEELS THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS PROPERLY 
9 PURSUED THEIR REMEDIES. 
10 THE COURT IS NOT PERSUADED THAT THERE IS SUFFICIE|I 
H EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS NOT AN 
12 INTEGRATED CONTRACT AND THE COURT, THEREFORE, GRANTS SUMMARY| 
13 JUDGMENT ON THAT CONTRACT AND FEELS IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE 
14 WHETHER IT IS A CONTRACT OF GUARANTEE, CONTRACT OF LEASE OR 
15 CONTRACT OF SECURITY AGREEMENT, THAT THE REMEDY SOUGHT, WHICtt 
16 IS PAYMENT OF THE AMOUNT PROMISED, IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
17 SINCE THERE HAS BEEN NO REPOSSESSION OF EQUIPMENT BECAUSE THp 
18 EQUIPMENT HAS DISAPPEARED. 
19 THIS FURTHER CONCLUDES THE DEFENSE FROM BEINjC 
20 A FACTUAL ISSUE AS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO MITIGATE 
21 DAMAGES AS THE COURT HAS FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF THAT BEFORE TH|1 
22 COURT. 
23 I AM GOING TO ASK COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO 
24 PREPARE THE ORDER, GIVE IT TO COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT AND 
25 THEN TO THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE. 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 3 
A. 37 37J2 
1 MR. COOMBS: YOUR HONOR, WHAT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF 
2 DAMAGES? SHOULD THERE BE A TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES? 
3 JUDGE BILLINGS: NO. I THINK THE AFFIDAVIT IS SUFFICIENT 
4 EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES AND THERE ARE NO CONTRAVENING AFFIDAVITS! 
5 TO INDICATE THOSE DAMAGES ARE NOT CORRECT. 
6 (WHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT AND COUNSEL 
7 WAS HAD, AFTER WHICH, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD): 
8 JUDGE BILLINGS: AS FAR AS ATTORNEY'S FEES YOU WILL HAVJE 
9 TO SUBMIT AN ATTORNEY'S FEES AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO THE RULES, 
10 UPDATE YOUR AFFIDAVIT, SERVE IT TO COUNSEL. IF THERE IS ANY| 
11 OBJECTION TO THE ATTORNEY'S FEES THE COURT WILL HEAR THAT, 
12 OTHERWISE IT WILL BE AS SUBMITTED IN THAT AFFIDAVIT. 
13 COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 












* * * 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 
A. 38 P> 
1 I C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 
3 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
4 | COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
5 
6 1 I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I 
7 AM A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
8 THAT AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED 
9 THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME 
10 AND PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN 
If SHORTHAND THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD 
12 THEREIN; AND THAT THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID 
13 SHORTHAND NOTES INTO TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING 
14 TRANSCRIPTION IS A FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION 







22 I MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
23 I JANUARY 14TH, 1988. 
24 
25 
EILEEN/ M(. AMBROSE, C . S . R . 
E i l e e n M. Ambrose , C . S . R . 
A. 39 
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